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THE 1981 MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE 

PROCEDURE ACT: THE IMPACT ON 

CENTRAL PANEL STATES 

DUANE R. HARVES· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In order to ensure public participation and uniformity in ad­
ministrative proceedings, federal and state governments have 
adopted administrative procedure acts. Since the adoption of the 
1961 Model State Administrative Procedure Act by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, state admin­
istrative law has grown enormously in size and complexity. This fact 
was noted and discussed by the Commissioners in their prefatory 
note when adopting the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure 
Act (MSAP A). 
During those twenty years, legislatures have been delegating 
more substantive authority to state agencies in areas of law such as 
energy and the environment which were not even being discussed in 
1961. These same areas of law have led to an increase in litigation 
following state agency action. Thus, the necessity of establishing a 
uniform act containing procedures to safeguard public participation 
yet maintaining agency flexibility and which will survive legal chal­
lenge almost speaks for itself. While the 1981 Act has provided some 
excellent suggestions for states to utilize, the central question is 
whether it has gone far enough in its attempt to ensure truly fair 
adjudicative hearings where individual rights, duties or privileges 
are granted, denied or restricted. 
Eight states have addressed this issue by creating an independ­
ent office to conduct administrative hearings. The independence of 
the persons conducting administrative hearings is necessary to en­
sure not only actual impartiality, but the appearance of impartiality. 
If government is judged by the methods by which it performs its 
tasks, the appearance of an evil is just as destructive as the evil itself. 
• Chief Administrative Law Judge, Minnesota Officc of Administrative Hearings. 
B.A., Mankato State University, 1963; J.D., William Mitchell College of Law, 1967. 
Faculty, National Judicial College; adjunct faculty, William Mitchell College of Law. 
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Therefore, an effective administrative procedure act, which is ex­
tremely important to all governments, should contain provisions for 
an independent agency of administrative hearing personnel, be they 
called administrative law judges, hearing examiners or hearing 
officers. 
The 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act I provides 
for the creation of an Office of Administrative Hearings as a separate 
agency to conduct adjudicative hearings.2 The provisions, however, 
are deficient in two respects. First, while proclaiming its indepen­
dence, it is proposed for inclusion within an existing executive 
branch agency.3 Second, state agencies would not be compelled to 
use the office,4 which could also have an adverse impact on eight 
states which have created a central panel of administrative law 
judges or hearing examiners to conduct administrative hearings.s 
This article will discuss these deficiencies and their impact on the 
central panel systems, with emphasis on the Minnesota system which 
was established in 1975.6 
II. INDEPENDENCE 
The MSAPA, in Article IV, Chapter III, proposes that the Office 
of Administrative Hearings (OAH) be located within another agency 
of state government. In the comments accompanying the MSAP A, it 
is stated: "The intent is to place the office in the most neutral possi­
1. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (Uniform Law Commission­
ers 1981) (approved and recommended for enactment in all the states at the N aliona! 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Annual Conference in New Orle­
ans. Louisiana. July 3 I-August 7. 1981) [hereinafter cited as MSAPA). 
2. ftJ. § 4-301. 
3. Id. § 4-301(a) provides: "There is created the office of administrative hearings 
within the [Department of • to be headed by a director appointed by the governor 
and confirmed by the senate)." Id 
4. Id. § 4-202(a) provides: 

The agency head. one or more members of the agency head. one or more ad­

ministrative law judges assigned by the office of administrative hearings in ac­

cordance with Section 4-301 [.or. unless prohibited by law. one or more other 

persons designated by the agency head). in the discretion of the agency head. 

may be the presiding officer. 

Id 
5. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 11370 (Deering 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-30-1001(1) 
(1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.65 (West 1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 7. § 4H (Michie/ 
Law Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.48 (West Supp. 1984); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-I (West Supp. 1983-1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-321 (Supp. 
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.12.010 (Supp. 1983-1984); and 1975 MINN. LAWS ch. 
380. § 60. 
6. 1975 MINN. LAWS ch. 380. § 60. 
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ble organizational position, so as to maximize the independence of 
the office."7 Can the OAH be truly independent if it is reliant on a 
larger agency for its budget, housing and other needs? A look at the 
systems in the eight central panel states may be helpful. 
First, where do we find provisions similar to MSAPA? Califor­
nia's Office of Administrative Hearings, headed by a director,S is lo­
cated within the Department of General Services.9 The director is 
appointed by the Governor subject to confirmation by the California 
Senate. to In Colorado, the Division of Hearing Officers is located 
within the Department of Administration, headed by a director with 
civil service status, 11 who also serves as the executive director of the 
Department of Administration. 12 In Massachusetts, the Division of 
Hearing Officers is located within the executive offices for Adminis­
tration and Finance. 13 Its chief hearing officer is appointed by the 
secretary ofthe executive office, with the approval of the Governor. 14 
Tennessee's Administrative Procedures Division, headed by a direc­
tor who is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the Secretary of 
State, is located within the Office of the Secretary of State. IS 
Examining the other central panel states, Minnesota's Office of 
Administrative Hearings is a separate agency of state government, 16 
7. MSAPA, supra note I, § 4-301 comment at 71-72. 
8. CAL. GOV'T CODE § I I 370.2(a). "There is in the Department of General Serv­
ices the Office of Administrative Hearings which is under the direction and control of an 
executive officer who shall be known as the director." Id 
9. Id 
10. CAL. GOv'T CODE § I I 370.2(b). 
II. M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, THE CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW JUDGES: A SURVEY OF SEVEN STATES 38 (1983). 
12. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-30-1001(1). "There is hereby created the division of 
hearing officers in the department of administration, the head of which shall be the exec­
utive director of the department of administration." Id 
13. MASS. ANN. LAW, ch. 7, § 4H. "There shall be within the executive office for 
Administration and Finance a division of hearing officers under the direction of a chief 
hearings officer who shall be appointed by the secretary of the executive office for Ad­
ministration and Finance with the approval of the governor." Id 
14. Id 
15. M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note II, at 37-39; TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-321. 
"[T)here is created in the office of the secretary of state a division to be known as the 
administrative procedures division." Id 
16. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.48. 
A state office of administrative hearings is created. The office shall be under the 
direction of a chief administrative law judge, who shall be learned in the law 
and appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate, for a 
term ending on June 30 of the sixth calendar year after appointment. ... 
[T)he chief administrative law judge shall be in the unclassified service, but may 
be removed from his position only for cause. 
Id 
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as is the Washington Office of Administrative Hearings'" In New 
Jersey, the Office of Administrative Law is independent, but, be­
cause of constitutional requirements, is located within the Depart­
ment of State. 18 Florida's Division of Administrative Hearings, 
while located.within the Department of Administration, which must 
provide administrative support and services, is specifically not sub­
ject to control, supervision, or direction of the Department of 
Administration. 19 
In Minnesota, the chief administrative law judge is appointed 
by the governor, subject to confirmation by the Senate, for a six-year 
term.20 Washington's chief administrative law judge is appointed by 
the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of 
five years.21 In New Jersey, the director is appointed by the gover­
nor with the advice and consent of the Senate for a term of six 
years.22 Florida's director is appointed by a majority vote of the Ad­
ministration Commission but serves at the· discretion of that 
17. WASH. CODE ANN. § 34.12.010. 
A state office of administrative hearings is hereby created. The office shall be 
independent of state administrative agencies and shall be responsible for impar­
tial administration of administrative bearings in accordance with the legislative 
intent expressed by this chapter. . . . The office shall be under the direction of 
a chief administrative law judge, appointed by the governor with the advice and 
consent of the senate, for a term of five years. 
Id 
18. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-1. 
There is hereby established in the Executive Branch of the State Government 
the Office of Administrative Law. For the purpose of complying with the provi­
sions of Article V, Section IV, paragraph I of the New Jersey Constitution, the 
Office of Administrative Law is hereby allocated within the Department of 
State, but notwithstanding said alloCation, the office shall be independent of 
any supervision or control by the department or by any personnel thereof. 
Id 
19. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.65(1). 

There is hereby created the Division of Administrative Hearings within the De­

partment of Administration, to be headed by a director who shall be appointed 

by the Administrative Commission and confirmed by the Senate. . . . The De­

partment of Administration shall provide administrative support and service to 

the division. The division shall not be subject to control, supervision, or direc­

tion by the Department of Administration. 

Id 
20. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.48. It should also be noted that the chief hearing ex­
aminer is the only department head in Minnesota who does not serve a term coterminus 
with the governor and at the pleasure of the governor. Id § 15.06(2). 
21. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.12.010. 
22. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-3. ''The head of the office shall be the director who 
shall be an attorney-at-law of this State. The director shall be appointed by the Gover­
nor with the advice and consent of the Senate. The director shall serve for a term of 6 
years." Id 
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commission.23 
From the foregoing, it can be seen that four of the existing cen­
tral panel states have adopted language similar to that found in the 
MSAPA,24 while the other four opted for actual and near total inde­
pendence.25 Only where the central panel is a totally separate and 
independent agency is true independence achieved. While Florida's 
director serves at the discretion of the Administrative Commission; 
in fact, the director has never been threatened with removal nor his 
independence challenged.26 The addition of a fixed term of office 
together with a removal only for cause, however, as recommended in 
the MSAPA,27 would certainly be the better approach. For that the 
drafters of the MSAPA are to be commended. 
But why stop short? The drafters missed a golden opportunity 
to provide for independence. We are unable to discern from the 
comments to the MSAPA why it was decided to place the OAH 
within another agency of government as the drafters are silent on 
that issue. One can only surmise that recommending the creation of 
the OAH was such a "hot" issue with the commissioners that com­
promises had to be made and total independence of the OAH was 
sacrificed in the process. 
Based on the experience of the central panel states to date, the 
data treating the OAH as a totally separate agency is the more 
favorable approach. While none of the semi-independent OAH's 
have complained of interference with decisional independence, lack­
ing total control over personnel and, more significantly, lacking full 
control of the budget has had an impact on these operations.28 
Therefore, it is recommended that when considering the creation of 
an OAH, states should legislate independence to their OAH rather 
than creating a "division" within an existing agency. 
III. MANDATORY USE OF THE OAH 
While the comments to the MSAPA indicate that "the question 
23. M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note II, at 38-39. The Florida Administration 
Commission consists of the governor and his cabinet of six. Id. See also FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 120.65(1). 
24. California, Colorado, Massachusetts and Tennessee. See supra notes 8·15 and 
accompanying text. 
25. Florida, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington. See supra notes 16-19 and 
accompanying text. 
26. Interview with Director Chris H. Bentley. 
27. MSAPA, supra note I, § 4-301. 
28. Conversations with directors of central panel systems in California, Colorado, 
Florida, New Jersey and Washington. 
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whether the use of administrative law judges from the OAH is per­
missive or mandatory depends on whether or not a state adopts cer­
tain language that is bracketed in [s]ection 4-202(a)."29 A reading of 
the bracketed language, however, does not necessarily mandate this 
outcome in every case. The bracketed language referred to is: "or 
unless prohibited by law, one or more other persons designated by 
the agency head."30 Even if one were to follow the suggestions in the 
commentary, an "agency head, [or] one or more members of the 
agency head"31 could still conduct a hearing, totally at their discre­
tion. This leaves to the agency the decision to keep or refer cases 
without any standards or criteria to guide it. Thus, an agency could 
choose to keep those cases of political importance to itself. This 
could deprive a respondent, in a sanctions case for instance, from a 
truly fair hearing before a totally impartial presiding officer. 
How have the existing central states responded to this issue? As 
was probably the case during the commissioners' deliberations, there 
is a split among the states. 
Colorado, Florida and Washington statutes have language simi­
lar to the MSAPA.32 In Colorado, the agency head may conduct the 
hearing and, if authorized by law, a hearing officer from the agency 
may conduct the hearing.33 Conversely, it can be deduced that if an 
agency is not specifically authorized by law to have its own hearing 
officers conduct the hearings, it must use a hearing officer from the 
Division of Hearing Officers if the agency head does not personally 
preside. Florida's APA most closely tracks the MSAPA language by 
requiring the use of a hearing officer from the Division of Adminis­
trative Hearings unless the hearing is conducted by an agency head 
or a member of an agency.34 Washington's act, while not tracking 
the MSAP A language verbatim, does allow the final decision to be 
rendered by an agency official even though that person may preside 
over the hearing.35 Thus, Colorado would benefit from adoption of 
29. MSAPA, supra note I, § 4-301 comment, at 71. 
30. fd. § 4.202(8). 
31. fd. 
32. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
33. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-105(3). "At a hearing only one of the following may 
preside: the agency or if otherwise authorized by law, a hearing officer who ifauthorized 
by law may be a member of the body which comprises the agency." fd. 
34. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(IXa). "A hearing officer assigned by the division 
shall conduct all hearings under this subsection, except for: 1. Hearings before agency 
heads or a member thereof other than an agency head ...." Id 
35. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.12.040. "Whenever a state agency conducts a 
hearing which is not presided over by officials of the agency who are to render the final 
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the MSAPA language but there would be no apparent impact in 
Florida or Washington. 
None of the existing central panels have jurisdiction to conduct 
100% of the administrative hearings in their states due to exemptions 
created by the legislatures in those states. However, the remaining 
five states have either mandatory language for all hearings or a com­
bination of mandatory and permissive. It is in these states where 
adoption of the MSAPA language could have a negative impact by 
allowing agencies to "pick and choose." 
The preferred language should read: "All hearings of state 
agencies required to be conducted under this chapter shall be con­
ducted by (hearing officers, hearing examiners or administrative law 
judges) from the Office of Administrative Hearings." This language, 
or very similar language, can be found in California,36 Minnesota37 
and New Jersey.38 Massachusetts requires use of a division hearing 
officer in certain cases and allows their use in other instances.39 In 
Tennessee, some agencies are specifically authorized to use an ad­
ministrative judge or hearing officer from the agency to preside over 
a contested case,40 alone or in conjunction with an agency head.41 
decision, the hearing shall be conducted by an administrative law judge assigned under 
this chapter." Id 
36. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11502. "All hearings of state agencies required to be con­
ducted under this chapter shall be conducted by hearing officers on the staff of the Office 
of Administrative Hearings." Id 
37. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.50. "All hearings of state agencies required to be con­
ducted under this chapter shall be conducted by a hearing examiner assigned by the chief 
hearing examiner." Id 
38. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-5n. "Assign an administrative law judge to any 
agency empowered to conduct contested cases to preside over such proceedings in con­
tested cases as are required by ... (C.52:14B-9 and 52:14B-IO)." Id 
39. MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 7, § 4H. 

[The chief hearings officer) shall hear, or assign for hearing, appeals filed pursu­

ant to section thirty-six of chapter six A and shall make available not less than 

three full-time hearings officers or the equivalent thereof, to hear appeals as­

signed pursuant to sections forty-two and forty-three of chapter thirty-one. . . . 

Any officer or agency oCthe commonwealth authorized to conduct adjudicatory 

proceedings or to hear appeals from such proceedings may, subject to the ap­

proval of the secretary of the executive office within which such officer is em­
ployed or such agency is located, request the division to conduct one or more 
classes of such proceedings or appeals on behalf of the officer or agency.... 
Id 
40. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-102: 
(I) "Administrative judge" means an agency member, agency employee, or 
employee of the administrative procedures division of the office of the secretary 
of state, licensed to practice law, and authorized by law to conduct contested 
case proceedings pursuant to § 4-5-301. 
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Where agencies are not authorized to have staff administrative 
judges or hearing officers, use of the Division of Administrative Pro­
cedures staff is mandatory.42 
As the foregoing illustrates, the majority of the central panel 
states utilize the mandatory language. What is most bothersome is 
how easy it would be to amend the proposed MSAPA language to 
allow deputy or assistant department heads to serve as presiding of­
ficers. If that were to occur in Minnesota, it could be assured that 
only the occupational licensing boards, the Public Utilities Commis­
sion and the Pollution Control Board would continue to have their 
hearings conducted by the OAH, along with the workers' compensa­
tion cases which are not within the Minnesota APA. The identical 
situation would occur in New Jersey and Washington43 and could 
(4) "Hearing officer" means an agency member or employee, not licensed to 
practice law, and authorized by law to conduct a contested case proceeding 
pursuant to § 4-5-301. 
Id 
41. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-301: 
(a) In the hearing of any contested case the proceedings or any part thereof: 
(I) Shall be conducted in the presence of the requisite number of mem­
bers of the agency as prescribed by law and in the presence of an adminis­
trative judge or hearing officer; or 
(2) Shall be conducted by an administrative judge or hearing officer sit­
ting alone. 
(b) 
(c) The agency shall determine whether the contested case shall be conducted 
by an administrative judge or hearing officer sitting alone or in the presence of 
the members of the agency; . . . . 
(d) Any agency authorized by law to have a contested case conducted by an 
administrative judge, hearing officer or similar officer from the agency may di­
rect that the proceedings or any part thereof be conducted by an administrative 
judge or hearing officer which the agency shall provide from the members of 
the agency or the agency's regular employees. Contested cases under this sub­
section may be conducted by administrative judges from the administrative 
procedures division of the office of the secretary of state upon the request of any 
agency being presented to the secretary of state and the request being granted. 
Id (Emphasis added). 
42. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-301(e): 
Any agency not authorized by law to have a contested case conducted by an 
administrative judge, hearing officer or similar officer from the agency shall 
direct that the proceedings or any part thereof be conducted by an administra­
tive judge from the administrative procedures division of the office of the secre­
tary of state. 
43. During each legislative session over the past seven years, Minnesota state agen­
cies have sought various exemptions from the Minnesota APA. Most notable was the 
exemption obtained by the Department of Public Welfare in 1976 which allows the de­
partment to use its own non-attorney referees to conduct hearings on appeals from 
county determinations of benefit eligibility under federally funded programs. The de­
partment has attempted, in each succeeding legislative session, to expand this exemption. 
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reasonably be expected to occur in other central panel states. 
Savings in both time and costs have been documented in both 
Minnesota44 and New Jersey.4S These savings have occurred be­
cause the hearings are conducted by persons properly trained in the 
conduct of hearings who have no other responsibilities. Addition­
ally, a central panel system allows grouping of different cases before 
one judge thus saving time and costs when travel is necessary. Fi­
nally, having all cases heard in a single agency allows a review of 
those cases to determine whether hearings are really necessary in all 
instances. In Minnesota, this has led directly to a reduction of re­
quired hearings by thirty-five percent as a result of legislation pro­
posed by the OAH and passed by the Legislature.46 Allowing 
agencies the right to hear their own cases thus defeats an important 
reason for creating a central panel system--savings of both time and 
costs.47 
Therefore, care should be exercised when considering the adop­
tion of the MSAP A so that what has been adopted in eight states will 
not be eliminated or weakened, and so that a newly created central 
panel will operate both efficiently and in a cost-effective manner. 
In order to correct the deficiencies noted in this article, when 
considering adoption of the MSAPA, the following amendments 
should be made to insure mandatory use of the OAH. 
§ 4-102(d): An adjudicative proceeding commences when the 





(a) The a!eBey head, eBe er mere members ef the ageftey 
head; One or more administrative law judges assigned by the office 
of administrative hearings in accordance with Section 4-301 ia the 
diseretieB ef t1te ageftey head, may shall be the presiding officer. 
The Minnesota Department of Public Safety continues to conduct its own driver evalua­
tion hearings even though the hearings are not exempt from the Minnesota AP A. 
In New Jersey, the office of administrative law has been involved in legal actions to 
compel the Commissioner of Banks and the Secretary of Labor to submit their hearings 
to the jurisdiction of the office. As in Minnesota, New Jersey agencies continue to try to 
obtain exemptions through the legislature. In Minnesota, New Jersey and Washington, 
state agencies were the leading opponents of the creation of the central panel in that 
state. (Conversations with directors of the central panels in New Jersey and 
Washington.) 
44. Harves, Making Administrative Proceedings More Efficient and Effective: How 
tire AU Central Panel System Worlcs in Minnesota, 65 JUDICATURE 257 (1981). 
45. Kestin, Riform of tire Administrative Process, 92 N.J. LAW. 35 (1980). 
46. Compiled statistics for in-house budgetary planning, Office of Administrative 
Hearings. 
47. The fair hearing arguments, being obvious, are not discussed in this article. 
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(e) If a substitute is required for a person who is disqualified 
or becomes unavailable for any other reason, the substitute must be 
appointed by!" the chiefadministrative law judge. 
(I) the go.erftor, if the disqtutlified or ufta.ailable penoft is aft 
eleeted oOieial, or 
(2) the appomtmg authorit" if the disqualified or ufta. ailable 
person is aft appomted offieial. 
§ 4-204: 
The presiding officer designated to conduct the hearing may de­
termine, subject to the agen:ey's office of administrative hearings' 
rules, whether a pre-hearing conference will be conducted. If the 
conference is conducted: 
(I) The presiding officer shall promptly notify the agency of the 
determination that a pre-hearing conference will be conducted. 
The agefte, shaH assigtt or request the oOiee of admiftistrati. e 
hearings to assigft a presidiftg offieer for the pre heaMg e6ftfer 
enee, exereismg the same discretion as is pro~ ided b, Seetioft .. 
202 e6neemmg the seleetion of a presidiftg oOieer for a heariftg. 
§4-215: 
(a) If the presidiBg offieer is the agen:ey head, the presidiBg 
offieer shaH ren:der a fiBal order. 
--(H"bl-W)(a) If the presidiBg offieer ~ n:ot the agen:ey head, The pre­
siding officer shall render an initial order, which becomes a final or­
der unless reviewed in accordance with Section 4-216. 
(e)(b) An fiBal order or initial order must ... 
(g)(f) An fiBal order or initial order pursuant. . . 
(h1(g) The presiding officer shall cause copies of the fiBalor 






(a) There is created the office of administrative hearings 
within the [Department of ] to be headed by a direetor chief 
administraiive law judge appointed by the governor and confirmed 
by the senate. The chiefadministrative law judge shall serve for a term 
ofsix years and may be removed only for just cause. 
(b) All adjudicative hearings required to be conducted pursuant 
to this act shall be conducted by an administrative law judgefrom the 
oJIice ofadministrative hearings. 
§ 4-503: 
(a) The agen:ey head, on:e or more members of the agen:ey 
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head, One or more administrative law judges assigned by the office 
of administrative hearings in accordance with Section 4-301, itt the 
diseretieft ef the ageftey head, may shall be the presiding officer. 
Uttless prehibited by law, a perseft e",ereisittg atltherity eyer the 
Blatter is tfie presidittg eftieer. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The drafters of the 1981 MSAPA, while trying to create inde­
pendence in adjudicative hearings, missed the opportunity to create 
a truly independent agency, the use of which would be mandatory. 
If adopted in the existing central panel states, the MSAP A would 
have a negative impact on five of those states' independent agencies. 
However, the MSAPA can, and should, be amended to correct the 
deficiencies before adoption. 
